This study presents evidence that unconditional and conditional conservatism help mitigate subsequent bankruptcy risk via their cash enhancing and informational properties. Bankruptcy risk is in turn positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism and negatively associated with subsequent conditional conservatism, reflecting auditor and regulator monitoring and managerial career motives. These findings are robust to endogeneity between unconditional and conditional conservatism, conservatism gaming, extreme distress and actual bankruptcy. Combined, these results suggest that accounting conservatism both influences and is influenced by bankruptcy risk, thus lending support to a traditional rationale for conservatism that will help inform ongoing debates regarding conservatism's role as a pervasive trait and tenet of financial accounting.
Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk
Introduction
We examine relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk and find negative associations between both unconditional and conditional conservatism and subsequent bankruptcy risk that follow from conservatism's accrual nature, cash enhancing and informational properties. Bankruptcy risk is in turn positively related to subsequent unconditional conservatism, consistent with auditor and regulator incentives, and negatively related to subsequent conditional conservatism, consistent with offsetting managerial incentives to withhold bad news. Overall, these findings will help inform ongoing debates regarding conservatism's continuing role as a longstanding tenet and pervasive characteristic of financial accounting.
Evidence that conservatism mitigates bankruptcy risk lends support to a traditional economic rationale for accounting conservatism that it arose at least a millennium ago in response to demands by capital providers to inform lending and liquidation decisions and reduce failure risk (De Ste. Croix (1956) , Watts (2003) , Basu (2009) ). Yet prior empirical evidence is mixed. For example, whereas some studies find conservatism to reduce debt costs and by inference bankruptcy risk others find positive relations between conservatism and debt covenant violations (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman (2002) , Zhang (2008) , Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) and Li (2010) ). We are unaware of any prior study that empirically examines links between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk. 1 Evidence that accounting conservatism lowers bankruptcy risk is also central to the interests of debtholders and other stakeholders who would be adversely affected by firm failure. These stakeholders shareholders (dividends and capital gains), managers and employees (career and compensation), customers (products and services), suppliers (sales), auditors and regulators (compliance) and governments (taxes and financial regulations). This evidence also informs conservatism's role in dampening economic panics, with recent financial crises heightening interest in mechanisms that counter bankruptcy-related contagions across supply chains, sectors and countries (Lang and Stulz (1992) , Hertzel et al. (2008) , Jorion et al. 1 Jones (2011) documents that R&D capitalization increases corporate failures, thus implying that expensing may reduce it. However, R&D expensing is an extreme form of unconditional conservatism relevant to R&D-intensive firms that cannot be readily generalized to other types of unconditional and conditional conservatism or firms. 2 Lang and Stulz (1992) document "contagious" valuation effects of bankruptcy announcements within the same industry. Hertzel et al. (2008) show that bankruptcy filings generate wealth effects for suppliers and customers along the supply chain, Our findings will also help inform ongoing debates regarding conservatism's continuing role as a pervasive feature and longstanding tenet of financial accounting. In Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) defined conservatism as "a prudent reaction to uncertainty to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered" (FASB (1980), p. 10 ).
This definition is consistent with conservatism being relevant to assessing bankruptcy risk.
However, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) removed conservatism from their conceptual framework in 2010 for violating neutrality. 3 In its exposure draft for the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (FASB (2008) ), the FASB argued that conservatism may produce information asymmetries that reduce investor insights into future cash flows from growth options. In contrast, Kothari et al. (2010) argue that the broader economic consequences of accounting standards are of first-order significance, while their role in equity valuation is of secondary significance.
Recent studies that document differences between unconditional and conditional conservatism motivate our further examination of how they seperately relate to bankruptcy risk (Beaver and Ryan (2005) , Qiang (2007) , Ball et al. (2009) ). These studies observe that conservatism can arise either "unconditionally" via inherently conservative accounting principles or "conditionally" via a more timely recognition of bad versus good news. Their evidence suggests that unconditional and conditional conservatism can play different roles in contracting, regulation, taxation, valuation and in reducing information asymmetries (Qiang (2007 (Qiang ( , 2008 ), and that they are negatively (positively) correlated in the short (long) run (Beaver and Ryan (2005) , Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) , Ball et al. (2009) ). They further suggest that auditors and regulators focus primarily on unconditional conservatism, litigation risk induces both, and that managers exercise more control over conditional conservatism, at least in the short run, preferring counter-conservative treatments for career advancement (Watts (2003) , Qiang (2007) , Kothari et al. (2010) ).
Our prediction that conservatism reduces subsequent bankruptcy risk is suggested by recent studies of its cash enhancing and informational properties. Specifically, they find that accounting conservatism reduces cash outflows by mitigating capital overinvestment, reducing and Jorion et al. (2009) provide evidence regarding credit contagions via counter-party effects, suggesting that borrowing firms' bankruptcy announcements cause negative abnormal equity returns and increase credit default swap spreads among creditors. 3 The FASB's Conceptual Framework defines and describes basic concepts by which financial statements are prepared and identifies qualitative characteristics that make information in financial statements useful. It serves as a guide to the Board in developing accounting standards and in resolving accounting issues not addressed directly by an existing standard. The IASB has a corresponding Conceptual Framework. These frameworks were combined into a unified set of accounting concepts and principles in SFAC No. 8 (FASB, 2010) .
risk-shifting, delaying economic losses, promoting precautionary savings and lowering agency costs (Lara et al. (2010a) , Callen et al. (2010b) , Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan (2010) , Srivastava and Tse (2010) ). Other recent studies find conservatism to increase cash inflows from operations by evoking more favorable terms from trading partners and by paring investment distortions (Hui et al. (2009b) , Lara et al. (2010a) , Bushman et al. (2010) ). These cash enhancing properties of conservatism reduce bankruptcy risk because bankruptcy is fundamentally a condition of cash insufficiency (Kim et al. (1993) , Uhrig-Homburg (2005) , Campbell et al. (2008) ).
Recent evidence also suggests that conservatism lessens information uncertainty and asymmetry via less optimistic reporting of net income and assets and the more timely reporting of bad news (Watts (2003) , Guay and Verrecchia (2007) ). This informational role of conservatism enhances cash flows and reduces bankruptcy risk as better-informed investors and trading partners provide more favorable financing and contracting terms. Under conditions of distress, conservatism facilitates negotiations and workouts among creditors, equity holders, trading partners, labor unions and other claimants, thus helping avoid bankruptcy filings (Giammarino (1989) , Mooradian (1994) ). These cash-enhancing and informational properties of conservatism suggest negative causal relations between both unconditional and conditional conservatism and subsequent bankruptcy risk.
That bankruptcy risk might in turn influence subsequent conservatism follows from the reasoning that higher bankruptcy risk induces conservative treatments that will enhance cash and reduce information uncertainty, thus reducing future bankruptcy risk. As bankruptcy risk increases, auditors and regulators pay particular attention to unconditional conservatism as it is the major contributor to total conservatism, is easier to monitor, and is not bad-news-driven ((Ryan (2006 ), Qiang (2007 ). In contrast, managers generally resist both unconditional and conditional conservatism to advance their careers, justify spending and portray more favorable performance, especially when bankruptcy risk increases, with their ability to do so stronger for conditional conservatism. This interaction between auditors' and regulators' interests and managers' career motives suggests that bankruptcy risk will be positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism and negatively associated with subsequent conditional
conservatism.
These predictions are tested using U.S. firm-year observations for the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] with available data for unconditional and conditional conservatism, bankruptcy risk and control variables. Two of the three bankruptcy risk measures are continuous ex ante estimates derived from Merton (1974) and Campbell et al. (2008) , respectively, which permit tests of causal relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk. The third measure is an ex post discrete (zero-one) indicator of actual bankruptcy filings not subject to measurement error.
Four measures of unconditional conservatism are considered: total accruals (adapted from Ahmed and Duellman (2007) ), rank of industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio (e.g., Ahmed et al. (2002) , Zhang (2008) ), hidden reserves (Penman and Zhang (2002)), and a factor score from a principal components analysis of the above three metrics. Four measures of conditional conservatism are likewise examined: accumulated non-operating accruals adapted from Zhang (2008) , an extended measure of Khan and Watts (2009) , a CR ratio measure adapted from Callen et al. (2010a) , and a factor score from a principal component analysis of the above three metrics. We mainly employ tri-variate VARX (1) and tri-variate VARX (3) models to examine causal relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk, extending Lara et al. (2009) .
Our main results confirm these predictions: (1) Unconditional and conditional conservatism are negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk, consistent with conservatism's cash enhancing and informational properties serving to mitigate bankruptcy risk, and (2) Bankruptcy risk is positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism, consistent with auditors' and regulators' interests, and negatively associated with subsequent conditional conservatism, consistent with countervailing managerial incentives to withhold bad news to advance their careers. These findings are similar for extremely distressed firms and for firms that actually declare bankruptcy.
In further analyses using VARX models with interactions among conservatism, cash holdings and informational properties, we find that both the cash enhancing and informational roles of conservatism help mitigate bankruptcy risk. . We further find that auditor and regulator monitoring increases subsequent unconditional conservatism as bankruptcy risk rises. These results are robust to endogeneity between unconditional and conditional conservatism, extreme distress, actual bankruptcy, conservatism gaming, debt contracting, earnings management, other control variables and alternative measures of unconditional and conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 details the conceptual framework and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and test methodologies. Section 4 presents empirical results and Section 5 concludes. Appendices A and B examine relations among bankruptcy risk and alternate measures of unconditional and conservatism, respectively.
Theoretical Framework
Conservatism has been a characteristic of financial accounting for at least a millennium (Basu (2009) 2), to enhance cash and transparency regarding net assets and net income, thereby helping avert progressions into ultimate conditions of default or bankruptcy.
The Cash Enhancing Role of Accounting Conservatism
Prior studies suggest that accounting conservatism enhances cash availability by both increasing cash inflows and reducing cash outflows. 
The Informational Role of Accounting Conservatism
Prior research suggests that unconditional and conditional conservatism play an informational role that reduces information uncertainties and asymmetries by constraining upward overstatement biases in net income and assets (Watts (2003 ), Li (2008 ) and by revealing bad news in a timely fashion (Lafond and Watts (2008) , Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) Both the cash enhancing and informational roles of accounting conservatism suggest that unconditional and conditional conservatism lower subsequent bankruptcy risk by increasing cash holdings and flows and by facilitating the avoidance of formal bankruptcy filings by firms in financial distress. This reasoning leads to the prediction that both unconditional and conditional conservatism will be negatively related to subsequent bankruptcy risk:
H1a. Unconditional conservatism is negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk.
H1b. Conditional conservatism is negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk. Since young firms as more prone to bankruptcy, we set a minimum data requirement for accrual-based conservatism measures of two years and employ one-lag specifications for VARX models, so that only firms with less than three-year histories are excluded. We omit post-bankruptcy firm-year observations for firms filing under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Relations between Bankruptcy Risk and Subsequent Accounting Conservatism
Bankruptcy Code since these observations may be incomparable with pre-bankruptcy data. To reduce the effects of outliers, observations in the top and bottom 1% of the major variables are winsorised, and firms in financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. The final sample is comprised of 34,897 firm-year observations for 4,621 firms.
Measures for Bankruptcy Risk
Bankruptcy risk is defined as the probability that a firm will liquidate under 
EDF.
EDF is the probability that firm's asset value will fall below its liabilities after T years (T = one year in this study), assuming that the firm's asset value (continuous rate of growth in assets) is log-normally (normally) distributed. Merton's (1974) option-based structural model expresses a firm's market value (V E ) as a call option on the firm's assets (V A ), with a strike price equal to the face value of debt, and time to expiration equal to T. Applying the Black and Scholes (1973) formula and Ito's lemma, we estimate EDF as:
where N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, X is the face value of a firm's debt, σ A is the volatility of a firm's assets, and µ is the instantaneous drift assuming the firm's market value follows geometric Brownian motion. EDF's intuition is that the probability that a firm's assets are insufficient to pay the face value of its debt increases with the firm's debt and asset volatility, and decreases with the firm's assets. Campbell. Campbell is the ranked probability of a firm declaring bankruptcy one month ahead. It is estimated quarterly by a logit model using stock market and quarterly accounting variables following the formula in the last column of Table III in Campbell et al. (2008) . We employ the Campbell estimate for the final fiscal quarter in our tests, as follows: intuition is that bankruptcy risk decreases with the predictability of market-based profitability (NIMTAVG), the predictability of excess return relative to S&P 500 index (EXRETAVG), the market-based liquidity ratio (CASHHMTA) and the stock price (PRICE). Bankruptcy risk increases with the market-based leverage ratio (TLMTA), stock return volatility (SIGMA), the market-to-book equity ratio (MB) and firm size relative to that of the S&P 500 index (Rsize).
In comparison to Merton (1974) Other relevant assumptions include: (1) creditors and managers have symmetric information about firm value and can observe the inputs into the model, (2) default occurs when a firm's asset value drops below its debt obligations at the time of maturity, (3) the default barrier is the exogenously determined fixed face value of debt, and (4) the asset value follows a diffusion process without jumps. 9 Other relevant assumptions include: (1) default time is unobservable and no longer tied to firm value falling below a prespecified default barrier, (2) default follows an intensity-based process (e.g. Poisson/Cox process) with exogenous latent variables, (3) the probability of default is logistically distributed, i.e., the cumulative probability of default takes a logistic functional form. We therefore use EDF and Campbell in our main tests.
Measures for Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism
Givoly et al. (2007) advise using multiple conservatism measures because they capture different aspects of conservatism, some with estimation error. Hence, we examine four firmyear measures of unconditional conservatism: UC_ACC (total accruals as adapted from
Ahmed and Duellman (2007)), UC_BM (rank of industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio), UC_RES (hidden reserves), and UC_PCA (a factor score from a principal components analysis of the above three metrics). We likewise examine four firm-year measures of conditional conservatism: CC_AR (extending Khan and Watts (2009)), CC_CR (extending Callen et al.
(2010a)), CC_ACM (accumulated non-operational accruals extending Zhang (2008)), and CC_PCA (a factor score from a principal components analysis of the above three metrics), as described below.
UC_ACC.
A proxy for unconditional conservatism equal to negative one times the ratio of average total accruals before depreciation to average total assets, both averaged over threeyear periods ending with the current year. Higher total accruals indicate a higher degree of unconditional conservatism by the rationale that conservatism results in persistently negative accruals (Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) 
UC_BM.
A proxy for unconditional conservatism measured as the industry-adjusted ranking of the product of negative one times the ratio of book value to market value of common shareholders' equity (Ahmed and Duellman (2007), Zhang (2008)). As UC_BM also reflects expected economic rents and future growth opportunities, we use R&D intensity to control for them following Ahmed and Duellman (2007) .
UC_RES.
A proxy for unconditional conservatism reflected in "hidden" reserves related to advertising (ADV), research and development (RD) and last-in-first-out inventory (2002), (2) CC_CR multiplies the CR ratio by -1 for good earnings news, so that higher CC_CR represents greater conditional conservatism for the good news case, (3) negative observations of CC_CR are not deleted from the sample, (4) intercepts are added to the VAR (1) model for estimating CC_CR.
10 INV it res is the LIFO reserve, RD it res is calculated using coefficients in Lev and Sougiannis (1996) to capitalize and amortize R&D, ADV it res is advertising expense capitalized and amortized over two years following Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) . Penman and Zhang (2002) use net operating assets as the deflator for hidden reserves, but since its value is negative for over one-sixth of our sample, which would potentially bias estimated hidden reserves, we use total assets as the deflator. When data are missing for LIFO reserves, R&D expensing and advertisement expensing, they are set to zero. 11 Whereas CC_AR derives from Basu (1997), and its criterion for classifying good versus bad news is whether the associated stock return is positive or negative, CC_CR derives from Vuolteenaho (2002), and its criterion for classifying good versus bad news is whether ROE, earnings scaled by book equity, is greater than the risk-free rate. Additional details regarding the estimation of CC_AR and CC_CR are available on request.
CC_ACM.
A proxy for conditional conservatism measured as negative one times the ratio of accumulated non-operating accruals over a three-year period to accumulated total assets, and is adapted from Zhang (2008 Therefore, we employ CC_PCA as the primary measure of conditional conservatism in the main tests.
Estimation Models and Methods

Following Lara et al. (2009), we employ VARX (vector autoregressive with exogenous
variables) models to test causal relationships between the two types of conservatism and bankruptcy risk. VARX models are estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), which improves efficiency when estimating systems of equations with correlated random errors by controlling for cross-equation correlations and when cross-equational error terms are small they approximate OLS. Because prior studies (e.g., Ryan (2006)) suggest that unconditional and conditional conservatism can be substitutes to some degree, we use a tri-variate VARX (1) model consisting of equations (3) to (5) to examine the causal relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism and bankruptcy while controlling for the endogeneity between the two types of conservatism, wherein hypotheses H1a, H2a, H1b and H2b predict γ 11 < 0, δ 11 < 0, β 21 > 0 and β 31 < 0, respectively: Campbell et al. (2008) and Eberhart et al. (2008) , this study predicts bankruptcy risk to be positively associated with leverage and return volatility and negatively associated with ROA, liquidity, cash flow, firm size and the risk-free rate and R&D investment intensity. (4) include previously identified determinants of unconditional conservatism, namely, the leverage ratio (Leverage t ), firm size (Ln(MV) t ) and R&D investment intensity (Inten_RD t ). 13 These variables proxy for demand for unconditional conservatism arising from contracting considerations, litigation risk, taxation and regulation, while investment intensity Inten_RD t is used to control for the effects of R&D investment and growth opportunities (Ahmed and Duellman (2007)). Controls t in equation (5) are the same as in equation (4) (6) to (8) are the same as those used in equations (3) to (5) Campbell are positive. Care should be taken in interpreting these latter correlations because they are subject to omitted variable biases. In the following sections, we systematically examine the lead-lag relations between unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism, and bankruptcy risk using multivariate analyses.
Controls t in equation
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
15 A measure possesses convergent validity when it is positively correlated with another measure for the same concept. However, alternative measures can have a low or even negative correlation if they measure the concept from different aspects. For example, when measuring unconditional conservatism using hidden reserves (UC_RES) and an accrual-based measure (UC_ACC), UC_ACC and UC_RES could be negatively correlated; firms with higher-level reserves may have lower incentives to use accruals to increase unconditional conservatism.
Causal Relations Between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk in Full and Extremely Distressed Samples
We first examine the lead-lag relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism using a tri-variate VARX (1) model described by equations (3) to (5), with results for the full sample and subsample of firms in extreme distress presented in Table 2 This result is consistent with expectation and suggests that bad news "shocks" associated with conditional conservatism generate demand for subsequent unconditional conservatism. UC_PCA t-1 also exhibits a positive association with subsequent conditional conservatism CC_PCA t , with coefficients (t-statistics) 0.0940 (2.12) and 0.0571 (1.29), respectively. However, when we take the first difference of UC_PCA to consider only the unconditional conservatism that occurred in a specific fiscal year, the coefficient is significantly negative. This result is consistent with prior findings that unconditional conservatism preempts conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan (2005) and Ryan (2006)).
the going concern assumption may no longer apply, making accrual accounting and unconditional conservatism less relevant. To investigate whether the results for the full sample hold under these conditions, we examine in Panel B of Insert Table 3 about here
To address possible concerns that our results are influenced by cross-sectional relations between unconditional conservatism, conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk or that our results are sensitive to lag structure, we examine relations between unconditional and conditional conservatism using a tri-variate VARX (3) model described by equations (6) to (8).
Results for the full sample are presented in Table 3 We further compare the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the corresponding VARX (1) and VARX (3) models used in Tables 2 and 3 to examine the optimal lag structure.
AIC is calculated as AIC = N*Ln((1 -R-sqr) / N) + 2K, where N is sample size, K is number is independent variables, and R-sqr is the proportion of the sum of square accounted for by the model under consideration. The last two lines of Table 3 indicate that AIC numbers for VARX
(1) models are consistently smaller than for VARX (3) models whereas untabulated results indicate smaller AIC numbers for VARX (1) models than for corresponding VARX (2) models.
Since lower AIC numbers indicate better fit, we use VARX (1) model in subsequent empirical tests. To address the whether results are similar for each complement of UC_PCA and CC_PCA, we present robustness tests for unconditional and conditional conservatism components in Appendix A and B respectively, with qualitatively consistent findings.
Relations between Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Actual Bankruptcies
Examining a subsample of firms that actually declared bankruptcy eliminates estimation error in estimating bankruptcy risk while precluding tests for the effects of bankruptcy on subsequent conservatism. For this reason, we test only hypotheses H1a and H2a for bankrupt firms using a logit model following Campbell et al. (2008) , where H1a and H2a predict γ < 0:
where BANK equals one if a firm files for bankruptcy under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and zero otherwise, and CON refers to unconditional or conditional conservatism measured by UC_PCA or CC_PCA, or both. Controls t include the following commonly used determinants of bankruptcy risk mainly identified in Campbell et al. (2008) :
the market-based profitability (NIMTAVG), the predictability of excess return relative to S&P 500 index (EXRETAVG), R&D investment intensity (Inten_RD), firm size relative to that of the S&P 500 index (Rsize), the stock price (PRICE) and the risk-free rate (Rate), which are expected to reduce the probability of BANK; the leverage ratio (Leverage), the liquidity ratio (Cash), changes in the liquidity ratio (ΔCash), return volatility (STD_Ret) and the market-tobook equity ratio (MB), which are expected to increase the probability of BANK. Other controlling variables include year and industry dummies, earnings management (Emgmt) and earnings smoothing (Esmooth).
Insert Table 4 about here   Table 4 reports the estimation results. Models 1 and 3 to 5 in Table 4 find UC_PCA t-1 to be significantly negatively associated with the probability that firms file for bankruptcy, a result that holds after controlling for earnings management and earnings smoothing. However, CC_PCA t-1 is insignificantly associated with the probability of bankruptcy in Models 2 to 5.
These results strongly confirm hypothesis H1a, but do not support hypothesis H2a for firms actually filing for bankruptcy. This is consistent with reduced incentives for conditional conservatism as firms enter into actual bankruptcy, perhaps because bad news is already 
The Cash Enhancing and Informational Roles of Accounting Conservatism and Causal Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk
This section examines how unconditional and conditional conservatism impact bankruptcy risk via their cash enhancing and informational roles. UC_PCA (CC_PCA) in the pre-resignation period is 0.3710 (1.2295), which increases (decreases) to 0.4200 (1.1639) in the post-resignation period, with t-statistics for these changes significant for UC_PCA and insignificant for CC_PCA. Overall, Table 6 provides evidence suggesting that SOX and auditor resignations increase unconditional conservatism more than conditional conservatism as bankruptcy risk increases, contributing to a positive relation between bankruptcy risk and subsequent unconditional conservatism as predicted by hypothesis H2a. where BR is EDF or Campbell and Controls t in equations (10) to (12) and their predictions are the same as for equations (3) to (5) and Controls t in equation (14) include Leverage t , ROA t , Ln(MV) t , Volatility_ROA t , and industry and year dummies, which are previously identified determinants of earnings smoothing. We consider two types of income smoothing to proxy for conservatism gaming: innate smoothing, the product of negative one times the Spearman correlation between accruals and OCF, and discretionary smoothing, the decile ranking of the product of negative one times the ratio of the standard deviation of accruals to that of OCF.
Conservatism Gaming and Causal Relations between Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk
Insert Table 7 about here Table 7 reveals that the causal relations between the two types of conservatism and bankruptcy risk observed above are robust to conservatism gaming. Qualitatively similar results hold for discretionary smoothing (results not tabulated). Zarowin (2006), Leuz et al. (2003) ). In contrast, discretionary smoothing has a weak mitigating effect on bankruptcy risk, whereas bankruptcy risk is negatively associated subsequent discretionary smoothing, consistent with the argument that discretionary smoothing reduces information transparency (untabulated results available on request).
Robustness Checks Sensitivity Tests for Validity of the VARX Models
Because VARX models are sensitive to order, we reordered predictors in each equation 
Controls for Debt Contracting, Debtholders' and Shareholders' Interests
Whereas results in Panel B of Table 3 suggest that relations between conservatism and bankruptcy risk hold for bankrupt firms, there remains the question of whether the observed relations are robust to controls for debt contracting, debtholders' and shareholders' interests.
To address this question, we replicate the tests in Panel A of Table 3 introducing additional controls for private debtholder monitoring, leverage, auditor going-concern opinions and credit ratings. Private debtholder monitoring is measured as the ratio of the sum of private long-term debt, other long-term debt and capitalized lease obligations to total long-term debt, following Qiang (2007) . Leverage is an indicator of higher debt costs, larger debtholder claims, more intense monitoring and accentuated conflicts of interests between shareholders and debtholders.
A dummy for periods following auditors' going-concern opinions proxies for enhanced debtholders control relative to shareholders. Untabulated results reveal that these additional controls do not qualitatively change our findings (available on request).
Debt ratings proxy for both cost of debt and monitoring by rating agencies. We code S&P long-term debt-ratings on a scale of 1 to 21, with 1 for a "AAA" rating and "21" for "D" 
Controls for Earnings Management
To examine whether our results are robust to earnings management, we rerun the tetravariate VARX (1) model consisting of equations (10) to (13) 
Alternative Measures of Unconditional and Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk
To address the possibility that UC_ACC and UC_RES insufficiently reflect discretionary unconditional conservatism, we alternatively use Qiang's (2007) accrual-based measure to replace UC_ACC, and the first difference of UC_RES to replace UC_RES. The results are qualitatively similar to previous findings. To address the possibility that the industry-adjusted BM ratio UC_BM captures both unconditional and conditional conservatism, we use the industry-specific component of the BM ratio to proxy for unconditional conservatism following Qiang (2007) and Beaver and Ryan (2000) to find that results are qualitatively unchanged. We do not use this measure in our main tests because it is invariant over time and thus inapplicable to VARX time-series modeling.
To address the possibility that CC_AR is subject to a potential mechanical relationship with EDF and Campbell since all are functions of leverage, return volatility, size and book-tomarket ratios, we use the negative skewness measure in Zhang (2008) to replace CC_AR.
Results for the tests in Panel A of Table 2 are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that this potential mechanical relationship is not a serious concern. Using an A_score defined as the ratio of the C score to the sum of C score and G score from Khan and Watts (2009) 
Conclusion
This study examines relations between accounting conservatism and bankruptcy risk that EDF is the ranking of the expected one-year-ahead default probability from Merton (1974) model. Campbell is the ranking of the one-month-ahead probability of business failure calculated based on the formula in the last column of Table III in Campbell et al. (2008) . BANK proxies for bankruptcy risk and is equal to one if the firm files for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy code, and zero otherwise. UC_PCA is the factor score generated from a principal component analysis of the three unconditional conservatism measurements: UC_ACC, UC_BM and UC_RES. Their eigenvalues are 0.9539, 1.1433 and 0.9028; their eigenvectors are 0.5380, 0.6342 and 0.6721; and their final communality estimates are 0.2894, 0.4022 and 0.4517, respectively. UC_ACC is equal to minus one times the ratio of total accruals to average total assets, calculated over a rolling window of the current year and prior two years. UC_BM is the industry-adjusted ranking of minus one times the ratio of book to market value of common shareholders' equity at fiscal year-end. UC_RES is the ratio of LIFO reserves plus hidden R&D and advertising reserves resulting from the application of unconditional conservatism to total assets, estimated as follows: UC_RES it = (INV it res + RD it res + ADV it res ) / AT it . CC_PCA is the factor score generated from a principal component analysis of the three conditional conservatism measurements: CC_ACM, CC_AR, and CC_CR. Their eigenvalues are 1.0461, 1.0324, and 0.9214; their eigenvectors are 0.3176, 0.5468, 0.8040; and their final communality estimates are 0.1008, 0.2990, and 0.6464, respectively. CC_ACM is minus one times the ratio of accumulated non-operating accruals to accumulated total assets, calculated over a rolling window of current year and prior two years. CC_AR is the ratio of C score plus G score to G score as defined in Khan and Watts (2009) , using the formula in Table 3 of Khan and Watts (2009) to calculate the CC_AR. CC_CR is the ratio of unexpected current earnings (or current earnings shocks) to total earnings news with the ratio times minus one if earnings news is positive. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage is measured as the ratio of book value of long-term debt (Compustat DLTT) and short-term debt (Compustat DLC) to total assets (Compustat AT). ROA is the ratio of earnings (Compustat NI) over total assets (Compustat AT). STD_Ret is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock return over the prior twelve months. Cash is the ratio of cash holdings (Compustat CHE) to total assets (Compustat AT). ΔCash is the ratio of cash flow (Compustat CHECH) to total assets (Compustat AT). Rate is the risk-free rate measured by the annualized three-month T-bill rate retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank Reports. Inten_RD is the ratio of R&D expenses (Compustat XRD) to total assets (Compustat AT). SOX is an indicator for the period after the passage of the SOX Act, equal to 1 for fiscal years 2003 and after, and 0 otherwise. Aud_Resign is an indicator for an auditor's resignation from a client firm equal to 1 for the three-year period after auditor resignation and 0 otherwise. Emgmt is the factor score generated from a principal component analysis of four earnings management metrics: the ranking of absolute value of discretionary accrual DA, abnormal operational cash flow R_OCF, abnormal discretionary expenses R_DISX, and abnormal product cost R_PROD. Their eigenvalues are 1.2992, 1.1747, 0.8823 and 0.6438; their eigenvectors are 0.2138, -0.7195, 0.8136 and -0.2691; and their final communality estimates are 0.0473, 0.5177, 0.6619 and 0.0724, respectively. Esmooth proxies for conservatism gaming and is measured as negative one times the Spearman correlation of OCF and accruals with both deflated by average total assets, measured using a rolling window of five fiscal years for all available accrual and cash flow data. Volatility_ROA proxies for earnings variability estimated as the variance of ROA calculated over a rolling window of the current year and prior four years. SPOS is an indicator for small positive earnings that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01, following Barth et al. (2008) . Turn is measured as sales (Compustat SALE) divided by end-ofyear total assets (Compustat AT), following Barth et al. (2008) . Eissue is annual percentage change in shares of common stock measured as the ratio of the change in shares outstanding at the current and previous fiscal year-ends to the common shares outstanding at previous fiscal year-end (Compustat CSHO). Dissue is annual change in total liabilities (Compustat LT) deflated by beginning-of-year total liabilities, following Barth et al. (2008) . Growth is annual change in sales (Compustat SALE) deflated by sales in previous period. Nimtaavg proxies for earnings predictability defined as the present value of the three-year sum of NIMTA, the annual net income deflated by total liabilities and market value, assuming earnings degenerate at the monthly rate φ = ½: Nimtaavg t-1,t-4 = . Exretavg proxies for return predictability of EXRET (past excess return relative to the value weighted S&P 500 index return over a period of 12 months), and Exretavg t-1,t-12 = , where EXRET it = log(1+R it ) -log(1 + R S&P500,t ), and φ = ½. Rsize proxies for relative firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of market value of equity relative to that of the S&P 500 index. Mb is the ratio of firm's market equity value to its book equity value at fiscal year-end. Price is calculated as the log of price per share winsorised above $15, following Campbell et al. (2008) . Sys. weighted R 2 0.5893 0.5125 *, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. The tri-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following three equations:
where BR = EDF in Model 1 and BR = Campbell in Model 2. F-statistics reported in columns 2 and 5 are for H0: γ11 = 0 and δ11 = 0; F-statistics reported in columns 3 and 6 are for H0: δ21 = 0, and Fstatistics reported in columns 4 and 7 are for H0: γ31 = 0. AIC number for VARX (1) -397,956 -398,824 -397,824 -396,725 -396,733 -396,733 AIC number for VARX (3) -308,057 -308,065 -308,065 -308,405 -308,413 -308 ,413 *, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. The tri-variate VARX(3) model used in this table consists of the following three equations: 
where BANK is the bankruptcy indicator equal to one for bankrupt firms and zero otherwise; CON refers to UC_PCA in Model 1, CC_PCA in Model 2 and to both UC_PCA and CC_PCA in Models 3 to 5. In Models 1 to 5, Controls include market-based profitability (NIMTAVG), predictability of excess return (EXRETAVG), market-to-book ratio (Mb), excess firm size (Rsize), leverage ratio (Leverage), liquidity (Cash), ratio of cash flow to total assets (ΔCash), return volatility (STD_Ret), stock price (PRICE), riskfree rate (Rate), R&D intensity (Inten_RD), and year and industry dummies. Sys. weighted R 2 0.7761 0.7778 *, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. The tri-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following three equations:
where Role = Cash and STD_Ret in Panels A and B, respectively. Controls are the same as those in the corresponding equations (3) to (5). 
where Exp = SOX and Aud_Resign in Panels A and B, respectively. Controls are the same as in the corresponding equations (3) to (5). Sys. weighted R 2 0.6080 0.5990 *, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. The tetra-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following four equations:
where BR = EDF and Campbell in Models 1 and 2, respectively. F-statistics in columns 2 and 6 are for H0: γ11 = 0, δ11 = 0; in columns 3 and 7 for H0: β21 = 0; in columns 4 and 8 for H0: β31 = 0. Controls in equations (10) to (12) are the same as in equations (3) Sys. weighted R 2 0.6742 0.6960 0.6965 0.6242 *, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90% , 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. The bi-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following two equations: BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11CONt-1 + α11Leveraget + α12ROAt + α13STD_Rett + α14Ln(MV)t + α15Ratet + α16Inten_RDt (1b) + α17Casht + α18ΔCasht + ∑α1jInd_Dum1j + ∑α1kYear_Dum1k + ε11 CONt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ22CONt-1 + α21Leveraget + α22ROAt + α23Ln(MV)t + α24Inten_RDt + ∑α2jInd_Dum2j Table A .1 reveals that all four measures of unconditional conservatism, UC_PCA t-1 , UC_BM t-1 , UC_ACC t-1 , and UC_RES t-1 , are significantly negatively associated with the subsequent bankruptcy risk as measured by EDF t ; Panel B reports the same pattern for Campbell t . For the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for EDF t and Campbell t are equal to zero, F-statistics are all significant beyond the 95% confidence level except for UC_ACC t-1 in Panel B. These findings support hypothesis H1a in suggesting that the cash enhancing and informational roles of unconditional conservatism lowers subsequent bankruptcy risk. Panel A of Table A .1 further shows that EDF t-1 and Campbell t-1 are significantly positively associated with subsequent unconditional conservatism except for UC_RES, suggesting that prior bankruptcy risk Granger-causes subsequent unconditional conservatism, consistent with hypothesis H1b. UC_RES t exhibits negative coefficients (t-statistics) of -0.0127 (-4.59) for EDF t-1 in Panel A, and -0.0042 (-2.27) for Campbell t-1 in Panel B. Although this result is inconsistent with H1b, it is consistent with the intuition that extreme unconditional conservatism in the form of immediate expensing of R&D and advertising expenditures is detrimental to managers' career motives, and dominates managers' disciplinary concerns and auditor and regulator interests, resulting in disincentives for UC_RES t as bankruptcy risk rises. Nor does this negative association for UC_RES t qualitatively change the positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent unconditional conservatism exhibited by the combined measure UC_PCA t . For the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for UC_PCA t , UC_BM t , UC_ACC t and UC_RES t are equal to zero, F-statistics indicate rejection beyond the 95% confidence level. Overall, these findings support hypothesis H1b in suggesting that bankruptcy risk stimulates subsequent unconditional conservatism, consistent with the interests of auditors, creditors and regulators offsetting managers' career motives in the case of unconditional conservatism, as predicted. 
Appendix B Causal Relations between Conditional Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk
This appendix reports estimation results regarding relations between conditional conservatism and bankruptcy risk using bi-variate VARX (1). In particular, the following bi-variate VARX (1) model consisting of equations (1b) and (2b) (4) and (6), respectively, with the same predictions. H1b and H2b predict that γ 11 < 0 and β 21 < 0, respectively, and Sys. weighted R 2 0.5300 0.8111 0.5043 0.5471 *, **, and *** indicates a coefficient is significant at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. The bi-variate VARX (1) model used in this table consists of the following two equations: BRt = α10 + β11BRt-1 + γ11CONt-1 + α11Leveraget + α12ROAt + α13STD_Rett + α14 Ln(MV)t + α15Ratet + α16Inten_RDt (1b) + α17Casht + α18ΔCasht + ∑α1jInd_Dum1j + ∑α1kYear_Dum1k + ε11 CONt = α20 + β21BRt-1 + γ22CONt-1 + α21Leveraget + α22ROAt + α23Ln(MV)t + α24Inten_RDt + ∑α2jInd_Dum2j Table B .1 reveals that all four measures of conditional conservatism, CC_PCA t-1 , CC_AR t-1 , CC_CR t-1 and CC_ACM t-1 , are negatively associated with subsequent bankruptcy risk as measured by EDF t , and Panel B reveals the same pattern for Campbell t-1 . For the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for EDF t and Campbell t are equal to zero, F-statistics are all significant beyond the 90% confidence level except for CC_ACM t-1 in Panel B. These findings suggest that conditional conservatism reduces subsequent bankruptcy risk, consistent with the cash enhancing and informational properties of conditional conservatism as predicted by hypothesis H2b. Table B .1 further shows that bankruptcy risk metrics EDF t-1 and Campbell t-1 are uniformly negatively associated with subsequent conditional conservatism measured by CC_PCA t , CC_AR t , CC_CR t and CC_ACM t . These findings suggest that prior bankruptcy risk lowers subsequent conditional conservatism, consistent with hypothesis H2b. For the null hypothesis that the predictor coefficients for CC_PCA t , CC_AR t , CC_CR t and CC_ACM t are equal to zero, F-statistics are all significant beyond the 99% confidence level. These findings support hypothesis H2b in suggesting that bankruptcy risk reduces subsequent conditional conservatism, and they are consistent with the notion that although it mitigates subsequent bankruptcy risk, conditional conservatism is resisted by managers whose career motives dominate their disciplinary concerns, as predicted.
